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Report on relocation of Japanese scored as inaccurate by former U.S. operative

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A report recommending reparations to ethnic Japanese who were relocated from the West Coast during World War II is "blatantly inaccurate and shockingly incomplete," a retired U.S. intelligence agent told The Washington Times.

The agent, David D. Lowman, 61, now lives in Honolulu. He is retired from the National Security Agency, the super-secret intelligence arm of the Department of Defense. After his retirement, Lowman served as a consultant to the agency on declassifying secret World War II documents.

Lowman said in a telephone interview from Honolulu that it is not his place to decide whether payments of \$20,000 each should be made to the surviving Japanese-Americans, as recommended by the Commission on War-time Relocation and Internment of Civilians in its recent report. But Lowman said there was no doubt that a great deal of spying was going on among ethnic Japanese on the West Coast during World War II. He said the commission was wrong when it said President Roosevelt and high-level advisers based their decision on "war hysteria, racial hatred and a failure of political leadership."

Lowman has been invited to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee when it opens hearings July 27 on the reparations question.

"I'm going to blow that commission out of the water," Lowman said. He said it is inconceivable that the commission could have ignored "The 'Magic' Background of Pearl Harbor," an eight-volume Department of Defense publication, which contains hundreds of Japanese diplomatic cables referring to espionage activities before and during World War II on a global scale.

"Before the U. S. Congress accepts the commission's report," Lowman wrote in a statement of which The Washington Times was provided a copy, "... thereby labeling Roosevelt a racist and political opportunist acting contrary to the advice of the intelligence community, it had better re-examine the advice Roosevelt was receiving and from whom.

"Even more important, it ought to look at the actual intelligence itself which was available to the president, including all those

'Magic' messages establishing Japanese espionage networks up and down the entire Pacific Coast from Canada to Chile."

Commission members said they had not been informed of the "Magic" volumes during their three-year study. After the commission recommended monetary reparations, however, it issued an addendum saying the commission staff had now studied the "Magic" reports and concluded they would have no effect on the final recommendation of \$20,000 to each survivor of the relocation.

The commission implied in a summary of its report that J. Edgar Hoover, then head of the FBI, had told Roosevelt and his advisers that relocation of the ethnic Japanese was not necessary and that only "careful watching of suspicious individuals or individual reviews of loyalty" were called for.

Lowman said, however, that Hoover was not on the list of the few persons who regularly received the decoded Japanese diplomatic cables. Furthermore, as the commission itself states in the body of its report, Hoover stated that the views of his field agents on the West Coast should be taken into account.

The FBI office in San Francisco apparently agreed that mass evacuation was not necessary. Los Angeles was noncommittal, but the FBI people in San Diego and Seattle were "vehemently favorable" to the idea.

In a statement widely quoted, the commission said: "Not a single documented act of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity was committed by an American citizen of Japanese ancestry or by a resident Japanese alien on the West Coast." In its addendum, issued after the "Magic" reports had been reviewed, the commission said, "That statement still stands."

Yet other experts disagree. For instance, the late Gordon Prange, who had been a military intelligence officer in the Far East and was a history professor at the University of Maryland until his death in 1980, stated in his book on the attack on Pearl Harbor, "At Dawn We Slept":

"As early as Dec. 10, 1940, the cooperation of Japanese bank officials in America was sought by Tokyo, and American authorities knew that a widespread Japanese espionage organization was operating in the United States for at least a year before the war."

Prange, who had been a naval officer and served as chief of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's

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